www.s8s6666.com:Now's not time for more Iran sanctions

Iranian President: We can reach nuclear deal
Iranian President: We can reach nuclear deal

    JUST WATCHED

    Iranian President: We can reach nuclear deal

MUST WATCH

Iranian President: We can reach nuclear deal 05:43

Story highlights

  • Congress has been discussing whether to impose more sanctions on Iran
  • Richard Nephew: Movement of such legislation still risks sparking escalatory cycle

Richard Nephew is a research scholar and program director for Economic Statecraft, Sanctions and Energy Markets at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. He is a former director for Iran at the U.S. National Security Council and was a member of the U.S. nuclear negotiating team with Iran from August 2013 to December 2014. The views expressed are his own.

(CNN)Some members of the U.S. Congress may be resisting proposed new sanctions on Iran, but their opposition doesn't seem likely to stop Congress passing legislation on Tehran's nuclear program by the end of March. As one of the negotiators who sat across the table from the Iranians for the past 15 months, though, I can assure you that legislation at this juncture risks undermining a deal that is clearly in the interest of all parties.

Fortunately, there now seems to be broad consensus that introducing more sanctions with immediate effect would simply play into the hands of Iranian hard-liners. With that in mind, ideas for moving legislation have turned to focus on two concepts: establishing a "trigger" for new sanctions, linked either to an arbitrary future date or a collapse in the talks, and defining what would constitute a good deal and requiring an "up or down" vote on it.
But as attractive as these concepts might appear, movement of such legislation still risks sparking an escalatory cycle that the talks neither need nor can handle. Indeed, Iran's parliament has already demonstrated the risk of raising the stakes now. In a step that directly mirrors the Senate Banking Committee's decision on January 29 to bring to the Senate floor a "trigger" sanctions bill, Iranian lawmakers moved forward a bill of their own that would require the termination of all compliance with the Joint Plan of Action, or JPOA, if new U.S. sanctions were approved or imposed.
    Should talks collapse, there is common understanding that the JPOA would fall apart and the status quo approach would return. But, through their separate actions, legislators on both sides guarantee it.
    To justify such a risk, proponents of new U.S. legislation often suggest that there are doubts internationally that sanctions will be expanded significantly should talks fail. However, there is scant evidence to support this supposition and much to suggest otherwise.
    For a start, sanctions enforcement has continued apace during the JPOA, which was originally agreed in November 2013. Nearly o100 entities and individuals have been sanctioned, and there are daily efforts by U.S. personnel to investigate cases and work with foreign partners on enforcement.
    Second, although businesses are showing new interest in Iran, no new commercial deals have emerged. I have discussed this issue with companies and banks, and they have relayed that they are waiting to see whether a final deal can be reached before plunging back into Iran because it was expensive and complicated to get out in the first place, and because many underlying risks remain present. The fact is that they won't go back until they know how the talks will turn out.
    Other critics focus on the quality of the deal being negotiated and want Congress to have a say. And as a negotiator, I spent almost as much time with members of Congress over the past 15 months as I did with Iranians and the P5+1. As a result, I was acutely aware of congressional views and ensured that they directly affected the policy options we pursued in the talks. Congressional concerns were raised at the negotiating table not only by U.S. negotiators, but by fellow members of the P5+1, and even by the Iranians. Congress is very much present in these negotiations.
    It is also important to remember that the disadvantages of defining a deal explicitly in law outweigh the theoretical negotiating advantages. If the point is to prevent a bad deal from being implemented by the United States, then Congress has less provocative ways to do so while talks are ongoing, including by refusing to fund the implementation of such a deal once reached. If the point is to create red lines for the Iranian negotiators, then Congress will have the opposite of its desired effect: defining a "good deal" in detail forces Iranian negotiators to cross our red lines to maintain their revolutionary credentials and sell a deal at home. Indeed, I have seen first-hand how Iran tends to reject any P5+1 idea that is leaked, because, if accepted, then Iran would be forced to admit a concession. Negotiating in private, with U.S. and Iranian requirements neutrally described in public, avoids this morass.
    All this suggests that the push for legislation now hinges on the claim that U.S. strength needs to be reasserted. This is staggering to me. If nothing else, our sanctions efforts against Iran -- of which I was a leading architect since 2006 -- demonstrate the strength and reach of U.S. power, if judiciously applied. The Iranian government will have to make real concessions to correct the damage sanctions have done to its economy -- it is not the United States that needs to shore up its position and we should act accordingly.
    Ironically, the one thing that could imperil our leadership abroad would be to undermine the talks at home. And legislation can have other negative effects: a slightly noticed part of the Iranian bill would require all sanctions to be terminated before a comprehensive arrangement could be implemented. If this became law, then Iranian negotiators would be powerless to allow the phased reduction of sanctions in response to Iran taking specific nuclear steps, a key element of the P5+1 approach.
    Ultimately, there is a role for Congress to play, but lawmakers should fulfill their oversight role without being unnecessarily prescriptive and, having set expectations for negotiators already, should leave the exact contours of a deal to our scientists, experts and diplomats.
    Congress should not harm its own cause by legislating on Iran now.
    澳门赌场 澳门赌场玩法 澳门赌场攻略 澳门百家乐 网上百家乐 百家乐玩法 百家乐技巧 电子游戏 MG电子游戏 现金网 赌博网 赌博网址 捕鱼游戏 捕鱼达人 老虎机 bbin电子游戏 威尼斯人网址检测中心 威尼斯人网站 威尼斯人官网 棋牌游戏网站 棋牌游戏 骰宝玩法 骰宝技巧 二八杠玩法 二八杠技巧 捕鱼游戏玩法 捕鱼游戏技巧 龙虎斗技巧 龙虎斗玩法 百家乐规则 赌博技巧 网上赌博 澳门百家乐代理 澳门百家乐玩法 澳门百家乐破解 澳门百家乐平技巧 澳门百家乐官网 澳门百家乐策略 澳门百家乐规则 澳门百家乐技巧 澳门百家乐游戏 澳门百家乐软件 澳门百家乐导航 澳门百家乐怎么玩 澳门百家乐网页游戏 澳门百家乐必胜课 澳门百家乐网址 澳门百家乐平注常赢玩法 澳门百家乐网 澳门百家乐论坛 网页百家乐 澳门百家乐必胜 澳门百家乐群 澳门百家乐官方网站 澳门百家乐试玩 澳门百家乐现场 澳门百家乐包杀 澳门百家乐qq 免费百家乐 澳门百家乐作弊 百家乐代理 澳门百家乐破解方法 澳门百家乐必胜方法 总统澳门百家乐 网页澳门百家乐游戏 澳门百家乐怎么样 实战澳门百家乐 澳门百家乐网络 澳门百家乐详解 澳门百家乐平台 澳门百家乐博彩网站 海王星百家乐 澳门百家乐怎么开户 澳门百家乐代理加盟 澳门百家乐合作 澳门百家乐赢家 澳门百家乐大路小路 如何打澳门百家乐 澳门百家乐怎样赢 澳门百家乐信誉 网页澳门百家乐 免费澳门百家乐 百家乐破解方法 百家乐必胜方法 网页百家乐游戏 线上百家乐 百家乐平注常赢玩法 百家乐怎么玩 百家乐代理加盟 百家乐合作 百家乐赢家 百家乐大路小路 百家乐怎样赢 百家乐信誉 百家乐破解 百家乐平技巧 捕鱼达人电子游戏 pt老虎机 pt电子游戏 mg摆脱电子游戏 捕鱼达人官网 老虎机游戏 千炮捕鱼电子游戏 老虎机经验 单机斗地主 捕鱼游戏大全 真钱电子游戏 真钱捕鱼游戏 电子游戏攻略 电子游戏技巧 澳门赌场 澳门赌场玩法 澳门赌场攻略 澳门百家乐 网上百家乐 百家乐玩法 百家乐技巧 电子游戏 MG电子游戏 现金网 赌博网 赌博网址 捕鱼游戏 捕鱼达人 老虎机 bbin电子游戏 威尼斯人网址检测中心 威尼斯人网站 威尼斯人官网 棋牌游戏网站 棋牌游戏 骰宝玩法 骰宝技巧 二八杠玩法 二八杠技巧 捕鱼游戏玩法 捕鱼游戏技巧 龙虎斗技巧 龙虎斗玩法 百家乐规则 赌博技巧 网上赌博 澳门百家乐代理 澳门百家乐玩法 澳门百家乐破解 澳门百家乐平技巧 澳门百家乐官网 澳门百家乐策略 澳门百家乐规则 澳门百家乐技巧 澳门百家乐游戏 澳门百家乐软件 澳门百家乐导航 澳门百家乐怎么玩 澳门百家乐网页游戏 澳门百家乐必胜课 澳门百家乐网址 澳门百家乐平注常赢玩法 澳门百家乐网 澳门百家乐论坛 网页百家乐 澳门百家乐必胜 澳门百家乐群 澳门百家乐官方网站 澳门百家乐试玩 澳门百家乐现场 澳门百家乐包杀 澳门百家乐qq 免费百家乐 澳门百家乐作弊 百家乐代理 澳门百家乐破解方法 澳门百家乐必胜方法 总统澳门百家乐 网页澳门百家乐游戏 澳门百家乐怎么样 实战澳门百家乐 澳门百家乐网络 澳门百家乐详解 澳门百家乐平台 澳门百家乐博彩网站 海王星百家乐 澳门百家乐怎么开户 澳门百家乐代理加盟 澳门百家乐合作 澳门百家乐赢家 澳门百家乐大路小路 如何打澳门百家乐 澳门百家乐怎样赢 澳门百家乐信誉 网页澳门百家乐 免费澳门百家乐 百家乐破解方法 百家乐必胜方法 网页百家乐游戏 线上百家乐 百家乐平注常赢玩法 百家乐怎么玩 百家乐代理加盟 百家乐合作